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Medicare HMO Pullouts
When the 105th Congress created the Medicare+
Choice program as part of the Balanced Budget Act of
1997 (BBA), it was heralded as one of their most
significant achievements. The new program was intended to expand choice of health plans for Medicare
beneficiaries, slow the growth in Medicare spending,
and better target the program’s resources. Yet, little
more than one year after the program was enacted,
nearly 100 Medicare HMOs have either reduced their
service areas or terminated their contracts, affecting
more than 400,000 beneficiaries. Nearly 50,000 of these
beneficiaries will have no other managed care options
available.1
Many congressional lawmakers expected Medicare+
Choice to expand the program’s managed care component, which currently covers about 15 percent of
beneficiaries, and create more health plan options for all
beneficiaries. But in certain areas of the country the
opposite has occurred. While the Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA) is quick to point out that the
overall trend is expansive, with more beneficiaries and
more counties having managed care options in 1999
than in 1997, the number and types of new plans
seeking to participate in the program have been disappointingly low.2 The overall rate of growth has been
much slower than the annual 25 to 33 percent increases
in plan participation and enrollment over the past five
years. Monthly enrollment growth has been falling
steadily since June, with a net increase of 38,186
reported in November. In 1997, enrollment gains
averaged more than 90,000 new members per month.
This sharp departure from expectations has created
anxiety within Congress and the executive branch,
setting off a flurry of finger pointing at the highest
levels in an attempt to assign blame or justify actions.
Adding to the drama was the last-minute notification of
nonrenewal by many of the plans just before the deadline on October 1. This Forum session will focus on the
reasons plans withdrew from certain areas, the BBA
provisions that have most directly influenced these
decisions, the impact the withdrawals have had on
Medicare beneficiaries, and policy options for ensuring
the viability of the Medicare+Choice program.

MARKETS AFFECTED
The first plan that announced it would not contract
with Medicare in certain markets seemed to set off a

domino effect across the nation. By the end of 1998, 30
states and the District of Columbia—about one-third of
all counties currently being served by Medicare risk
contracts—were affected by these actions. In total, 372
counties were affected by nonrenewals and service area
reductions; 72 counties had no other managed care
options available.
With 58,571 beneficiaries, Florida appears to be the
hardest-hit state, followed by New York (54,508);
California (48,387); Texas (46,591); Maryland
(34,595); Washington (30,515), Ohio (28,854), and
Illinois (23,711). New England states (New Hampshire,
Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island) and midAtlantic states (New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Maryland, Delaware, and Virginia) and the District of
Columbia seem to be significantly affected as well. No
Medicare HMO was offering services in Utah as of
January 1, 1999.
Large, for-profit plans dominated the types of plans
announcing pullouts, with United HealthCare’s and
Pacificare’s withdrawals affecting the largest number of
beneficiaries (54,383 and 53,926, respectively). Also
reporting significant departures were Aetna (44,006),
Foundation Health Plans (29,756), Humana (28,052),
and Oxford (26,972). Big nonprofits that withdrew had
a more modest impact; for example, Allina Health Plan
in Minnesota dropped coverage for 7,000 beneficiaries
and Kaiser Permanente’s withdrawals affected 5,200.
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About one-third of the counties affected by a risk
contract termination or service reduction are in rural
areas—a total of 120 counties and 56,142 beneficiaries.
Of the 72 counties that no longer have managed care
options available, 51 are in rural counties, affecting
15,158 beneficiaries.
It is important to note, however, that only a few
Medicare-risk contractors—Intermountain Health Care,
MAMSI, and two provider-sponsored organizations in
the Medicare Choices demonstration—left the Medicare
business entirely. Most of the plan terminations involved companies that have remained in the Medicare
risk business in other markets. And a recent Milliman
and Robertson survey indicates that, while HMOs have
scaled back their expansion plans in newer areas, they
do not intend to reduce their presence in established
Medicare markets.3

IMPACT ON BENEFICIARIES
Many Medicare beneficiaries have been troubled
and confused by the news that some Medicare HMOs
have pulled out of markets.4 Health insurance counseling agencies, employers that sponsor Medicare supplemental plans, and health plans have been flooded with
calls. The majority of beneficiaries who lost coverage
had the option of joining another HMO in their area,
but sometimes that meant changing doctors or losing
benefits such as prescription drug coverage or vision
care, which are not covered by Medicare.
While beneficiaries are entitled to return to traditional Medicare fee-for-service, it generally means much
higher out-of-pocket costs. In the past, Medicare HMOs
frequently offered beneficiaries significant cost savings
by allowing them to forego the purchase of expensive
Medigap insurance because the HMOs typically provided extra benefits (for example, prescription drug
coverage) at no additional cost to the beneficiaries.
Under the BBA, beneficiaries who lost their HMO
coverage were entitled to buy low-end Medigap policies,
but none of these pay for prescriptions. If the beneficiaries had been in the HMO for less than a year, they may
also be entitled to get their old Medigap coverage back,
but not always at the price they paid originally. And
Medigap prices can be steep. The American Association
of Retired Persons (AARP) estimates that Medicare
beneficiaries paid an average of $104 a month last year
for Medigap policies; Medigap plans covering prescription drugs often cost much more.5
Many large employers have also been stung by the
HMO withdrawals. According to a recent Hewitt

Associates survey, about one-third of employers currently sponsor a Medicare HMO for post-65 retiree
health coverage.6 Of those employers, 12 percent stated
that those HMOs have indicated they will probably
eliminate some of their current locations. About 28
percent of the employers with Medicare HMOs have
experienced some form of significant premium increases or benefit design reductions for 1999. Many
large employers report that the withdrawals created
confusion among their retirees and have made some
wary of HMOs. Some employers have expressed
disappointment that plans did not provide adequate
warning of their intent to pull out. As a result, employers say, they had no opportunity to help craft a smooth
transition for retirees affected by the withdrawals.7
In the end, the withdrawals affected 7 percent of all
Medicare beneficiaries and only 1 percent lost their
managed care option. Nevertheless, 50,000 beneficiaries were unable to obtain coverage in another Medicare
HMO. Moreover, advocates for the elderly have suggested that the turmoil and disruption in the HMO
market could make elderly individuals reluctant to join
an HMO in the future.
Many beneficiaries have joined HMOs in order to
receive prescription drug coverage—a benefit not
normally covered by Medicare that saves them significant out-of-pocket expense. Yet analysts warn that the
likelihood of HMOs’ offering them unrestricted drug
coverage in the future is dim. In the past, payment to
HMOs had been high enough to allow them to fund
extra benefits beyond Medicare’s basic benefit package.
The BBA attempts to correct for this “overpayment” by
tightening the rates to more accurately reflect the costs
of providing Medicare-covered benefits. As a result,
plans have suggested that they intend to raise member
premiums, decrease benefits, or reduce provider compensation in the future in response to these changes.8
HMOs are also expected to lower prescription drug
benefits in response to the continued rise in pharmaceutical costs.

REASONS FOR WITHDRAWALS
Several reasons have been put forward to explain
the HMO exodus from Medicare. The HMO industry,
HCFA, and most analysts seem to agree that Medicare
payment rates and methodology were the chief reason
that plans pulled out of certain markets. Whether or
not the payments are adequate or fairly calculated,
however, is a matter of sharp disagreement. Other
reasons frequently cited include increased regulatory
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requirements; filing dates and requirements for determining “adjusted community rates”; a significant
increase in cost trends, particularly in the area of
pharmacy; network problems and marginal market
penetrations; and risk adjustment uncertainty.

Payment Rates and Methodology
The BBA substantially restructured the system for
setting the rates that Medicare pays health plans. In
general, Republican lawmakers wanted to increase the
number of health plan options available to beneficiaries.
The new payment system was intended to address many
of the problems associated with the previous adjusted
average per capita cost (AAPCC) payment system, such
as inequity across counties and artificial ties to the
Medicare fee-for-service system. Since its inception,
critics of the AAPCC system have complained that
HMO payment rates are uneven and complicated.
Because the AAPCC rate paid 95 percent of estimated
fee-for-service costs, critics argued that the payment
method rewarded inefficient markets. Thus, many
lawmakers wanted to sever the link between local feefor-service costs and payment updates to plans.
In addition, rural counties typically received a low
payment rate, which inhibited health plan participation.
Several lawmakers pushed to establish a “minimum
floor” to bolster the payment rates in these low penetration areas.
On the other hand, some lawmakers wanted to
ensure that HMOs were no longer “overpaid” by
Medicare. Several studies submitted to Congress have
indicated that HMOs were paid more than actual costs
as a result of both the payment formula and favorable
risk selection. The former Physician Payment Review
Commission (PPRC), in its 1997 Annual Report to
Congress, estimated that Medicare was paying up to $2
billion in excess payments to managed care plans each
year. The Congressional Budget Office has said HMO
costs average roughly 87 percent of Medicare fee-forservice costs—less than 95 percent of costs that the
AAPCC formula reimbursed. And the DHHS Office of
Inspector General has said that Medicare HMOs
overstated their anticipated administrative costs in 1994,
1995, and 1996 by as much as $2 billion. In response to
these reports, some lawmakers sought to limit growth in
payments to managed care plans.
The resulting payment system enacted under the
BBA represents a political compromise. Under the new
system, plans were to receive the greatest of three
possible rates:





a new minimum or “floor” payment ($379.84 in
1999),
a minimum 2 percent increase over the previous
year’s rate, or
a blend of the county rate and a national rate.

Further complicating the equation, the BBA mandates that the new payment rates must achieve budget
neutrality so that total payments under the new system
are no greater than total payments would have been if
calculated on a basis similar to the AAPCC. The BBA
stipulates that, if aggregate payments are too high,
adjustments must be made only to blended rates in order
to protect the floor payment and minimum 2 percent
increase from reductions.
As a result of these multiple moving parts and
Medicare’s recent low growth rates, the increases in
payment rates were not as high as many plans, HCFA,
or Congress had anticipated. Application of the budget
neutrality provision resulted in rates for all counties that
were either at the floor or the minimum 2 percent
increase. Thus, no county rates for 1998 and 1999 were
based on the blend. The blended rates were expected to
increase payments and encourage Medicare+Choice
offerings in rural and other low payment areas.9
Several other changes to the payment rates will be
occurring simultaneously over a five-year implementation
period. Graduate medical education (GME) costs, which
had been included in HMO payments under the old
system, have been carved out of county rates over the
five-year implementation period and will be paid directly
to teaching hospitals. The blended local/national rate must
reach a 50/50 balance over the same time period. The
national rate, local rates, and the minimum payment
amount will be annually updated based on per capita
Medicare growth. Moreover, the BBA directs the secretary of health and human services to implement risk
adjustments to payments by January 1, 2000.
As stated earlier, rural counties represented a large
share of those affected by the plan withdrawals. Plans
argue that the payment floor of $380 per member per
month does not adequately cover the added costs of
assembling networks and operating HMOs in rural
areas in which they have low enrollments, little cost
control or ability to negotiate with providers, and no
real prospects for payment increases above the floor
payment.
Nineteen ninety-eight was the first year in which
Medicare payments in all but the rural counties were
subjected to the 2 percent minimum increase. Plans
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report that health care costs are rising faster than
Medicare reimbursements. In some cases, HMOs saw
their medical-loss ratios—the percentage of premium
dollars they pay for medical costs as opposed to administrative and other costs—exceed 100 percent. The
blended payments, if they had been implemented,
would have cushioned the shock of going from 8 to 10
percent annual rate increases to the minimum 2 percent
increase for some plans. On the other hand, HCFA
notes that the 2 percent increase was meant to be a
guarantee. As designed, the blended payment rate is
intended to move some dollars from high payment areas
to low payment areas, which means some plans will
receive less than in the past. The 2 percent increase
insures that no plans receive less than the minimum
update. Nevertheless, plans report that the prospect of
long-term fixed growth at 2 percent caused some to
withdraw from Medicare in certain markets because
they were worried about their ability to achieve profitability over the long term, especially when health care
inflation is expected to rise 6 percent annually over the
next four years.10

and to make payments more equitable across counties.
“By their very nature, these policies will change payment rates in ways that lead plans to retrench in some
areas and to take advantage of opportunities newly
available to them in other areas,” noted Gail Wilensky,
chair of the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission
(MedPAC), in recent congressional testimony.12

The user fee associated with the beneficiary education information campaign has also been blamed for
reducing the dollar payment update to health plans and
causing plans to withdraw. Under the BBA, HCFA is
authorized to withhold a fee from each Medicare+
Choice plan to finance a beneficiary education program
to assist Medicare beneficiaries in making informed
choices about their health plan options. Each plan is
assessed a portion of the total $95 million outlay on the
basis of its share of total Medicare+Choice payments
(about $32 billion for 1998). The program is intended
to provide beneficiaries with objective information
about their health plan options. Plans argue that the
costs should be spread across the entire Medicare
market, not just the Medicare+Choice plans.



Some analysts have argued that the plans’ retreat
from Medicare simply demonstrates that so-called easy
money is no longer available. In testimony before
Congress, Judith Feder, professor of public policy at
Georgetown University, argued that the
relatively high historical payments to managed care
plans provide them with a strong cushion to absorb
lower rates of increase in the future and still earn
healthy returns and provide broad benefits to Medicare enrollees, consistent with quality standards
equivalent to those applied in the private sector.11

Other Medicare experts say these changes in the
marketplace should not be unexpected. The BBA was
intended to slow growth in payments to private plans

In summary, health plans argue that payment rates
are below costs in some areas and the 2 percent annual
increase will not keep up with inflation. The opposing
view is that plans have received overly generous
payments for the past several years and the withdrawals represent a normal sorting out process associated
with market competition and appropriate payment
restructuring.

Increased Regulatory Requirements
HCFA issued interim final rules for the Medicare+
Choice program on June 26, 1998. Known as the
“mega-reg,” the 800-page regulations set forth detailed
requirements for plans that participate in the
Medicare+Choice program, including:








Quality assurance and performance improvement
requirements. Medicare+Choice organizations will
be required to achieve compliance through the use
of HCFA’s Quality Improvement System for Managed Care (QISMC).13
Specified enrollment information and encounter data
collection requirements (including a requirement for
100 percent “accuracy, completeness, and truthfulness”).
Rules governing access to health care such as direct
access to specialists and emergency care.
New appeal and grievance requirements.
Marketing material revisions.
New provider contracting requirements.

HMOs have said that the burden imposed by the
Medicare+Choice regulation has caused some HMOs to
stop serving Medicare beneficiaries. Because of the
fluctuating market conditions in which they operate,
plans contend that the regulations should provide
flexibility rather than rigid, bureaucratic requirements.
The plans argue that the Medicare+Choice regulation
will require extensive new compliance activities that
must be initiated even before, in some cases, HCFA has
issued detailed guidance to supplement the regulations.
In addition, the rules require tight implementation
schedules that plans have criticized as unrealistic. In
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testimony before Congress, Willis Gradison, then
president of the Health Insurance Association of
America, said “Even if fiscally possible, the procurement, installation, training, and validation time requirements would take years to fully implement.”14

premiums and cost-sharing and reduce benefits to their
Medicare enrollees. Several senior groups supported
HCFA’s decision, saying that allowing plans to resubmit
their ACRs would have “undermined the integrity of the
whole competitive process of Medicare+Choice.”17

It is important to note that most of these requirements
and time lines were mandated by Congress as part of the
BBA. These provisions were intended to provide more
protections to beneficiaries and to move HCFA in the
direction of operating more like a private purchaser,
making performance demands on the plans with which
they contract. Proponents of the new data requirements
argue that they are very similar to what is currently
required by large private purchasers. Nevertheless, plans
say, the regulatory requirements contributed to their
decisions to withdraw from the Medicare market and
argue that HCFA’s approach has been “needlessly
ambitious and complex.”15 In response to plans’ concerns,
HCFA has announced some refinements since the regulations were released, especially relating to the quality
improvement requirements. It has also announced that
plans will have an additional year to implement compliance plans and complete contracts that incorporate new
requirements with their current providers.

Provider Network Problems and
Marginal Market Share

ACR Filings
As part of the Medicare+Choice structure, health
plans had to submit their annual “adjusted community
rate” (ACR) to HCFA in May 1998 instead of in
November, the customary month for compliance. The
deadline was moved up to give HCFA more time to
compile information for distribution during the November Medicare beneficiary information campaign.
ACRs detail benefits beyond basic coverage that the
plan will offer as well as the cost-sharing requirements
for Medicare beneficiaries. According to the American
Association of Health Plans (AAHP), a significant
factor in the decisions of plans to reduce their service
areas or withdraw from the Medicare program was their
inability to revise ACR filings submitted last May,
before the mega-reg had been issued. Indeed, AAHP
embarked on an intensive lobbying campaign for HCFA
to allow plans to amend their ACRs. The plans maintain
that they could not anticipate the cost of complying with
the Medicare+Choice interim final regulations or
providing unexpectedly high cost trend items, such as
prescription drugs.16
HCFA refused the plan’s request to resubmit their
ACRs. HCFA’s position is that it would not be in the best
interest of beneficiaries to allow HMOs to increase

While low reimbursement rates are among the most
frequently cited reasons for HMO withdrawals, other
market conditions clearly impacted plans’ decisions.
Some analysts have suggested that the pullouts are
simply a “market correction,” stabilizing the rapid
expansion of HMOs into the Medicare market over the
last few years. In some cases, the termination of a
contract was the result of a merger between two plans
in which only one corporate entity will continue to
contract with Medicare. Some plans have also terminated their contracts with the Federal Employees Health
Benefits Program and Medicaid, suggesting that plans’
decision were based on reasons beyond Medicare
payment issues.
For some plans, the withdrawal decision seems to be
based more on their enrollment growth potential and the
ability to be profitable in the long term. For example,
Aetna pulled out of Massachusetts, where payment rates
in Boston are as high as $650 per member per month,
and Tolland County in Connecticut, where payments
average $500 per beneficiary, the second highest in the
state.18 Many of these plans had a limited capacity to
reduce costs and minimal prospects for revenue growth.
Most of the plans terminating Medicare contracts in
New England, for example, had been losing money in
these markets.19
A number of plans never gained sufficient market
share to be sustainable. Prior to enactment of the BBA,
many plans had crowded into high payment areas. In
several cases, plans that did not renew had only a few
thousand enrollees in a given market.20
In some cases, health plans had negotiated provider
contracts that were favorable to the providers to gain
entry to the market and build networks. These contracts
had left plans with few tools to manage or reduce costs.
In California, for example, PacifiCare pulled out of
some markets because it was unable to reach agreements with provider groups; this was also true for
Allina Health System in Minnesota, where the plan was
unable to contract with clinics, forcing it to leave
certain markets. Some health plans have attributed
provider network problems to the disparity in payments
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to managed care plans relative to fee-for-service. In
testimony before Congress, AAHP President Karen
Ignagni said, “Health plans are experiencing difficulties
in maintaining adequate provider networks because
providers are unwilling to accept lower payments.”21
Some analysts have suggested that plans viewed
1998 as a unique window in which they could terminate
their old Medicare contracts and preserve their right to
apply in the next few years as Medicare+Choice contractors. Once Medicare+Choice is fully in effect, plans
that withdraw will face a five-year lock-out from
participating in that service area again. Moreover, some
have suggested that plans terminated more contracts in
1998 in order to “turn up the heat” on Congress to
revisit the payment issue in 1999.

Risk Adjustment Uncertainty
The BBA requires HCFA to implement a risk
adjustment method to set payment rates based on the
“expected relative health status of each enrollee.” Risk
adjustment is intended to ensure that health plans are
not penalized for enrolling the chronically ill and do not
benefit from favorable risk selection. In its 1996 Annual
Report to Congress, PPRC estimated that HMOs
received overpayments of about 5 to 6 percent per
beneficiary because the populations they enrolled were
healthier than the general Medicare population. A
General Accounting Office study also found that HMOs
tend to attract the least costly enrollees within each
health status group.22 Health plans argue that their
populations are just as sick but are better managed than
those of their fee-for-service counterparts. In theory,
risk adjustment would make beneficiaries equally
attractive to enroll—regardless of health status—if the
methodology works as intended. The BBA requires the
system to be in place no later than January 1, 2000.
HCFA released a notice in September 1998 describing the risk adjustment method it intends to implement—a system that would group each Medicare
beneficiary into one of several diagnostic cost groups
based on demographic status and prior rates of hospitalization, using inpatient hospital encounter data. Payments to Medicare+Choice plans would be adjusted for
each Medicare beneficiary, based on whether the
individual’s “risk factor” is higher or lower than that of
an average beneficiary.23
This approach has been met with considerable
criticism. Health plans argue that it would penalize plans
that have effectively reduced inpatient hospital use and
focused on providing more care on an outpatient basis.

In testimony before Congress last October, Gradison
said that
incentives created by risk adjustment methodology
based exclusively on inpatient hospital data, even if
applied only for a few years, would result in increased
hospital use, increased avoidable costs, and a setback
in the effort to realize greater efficiency in the health
care system.24

Several organizations have urged Congress to delay
the implementation of risk adjustment methodology
until information from a broader range of health care
settings can be gathered and used. MedPAC has recommended that this method of risk adjustment be phased in
to temper the effect of risk adjustment on payment rates.
Furthermore, MedPAC urged HCFA to move as quickly
as feasible to develop the capability to use diagnosis data
from all sites of care for risk adjustment.25 HCFA
anticipates that the risk adjustment method will be
refined as new and additional sources of encounter data
become available. The interim final regulations require
that all Medicare+Choice organizations provide physician, outpatient hospital, skilled nursing facility, and
home health data beginning as early as October 1, 1999.
The health insurance industry maintains that these time
frames are too short and are unreasonable.
In recent testimony before Congress, HCFA officials
said they expect to implement the system on schedule in
2000; recently, however, they have been signaling that
they may agree to a phased-in implementation. In the
meantime, HCFA has said it will provide each plan with
an estimate of risk adjustment’s impact on their payments early in 1999. HCFA estimates that plans on
average will see reductions in payments of 7 to 9
percent due to risk adjustment. Plans say the uncertainty
surrounding risk adjustment also contributed to their
decisions to pull out of certain markets.

POLICY OPTIONS
Several policy options have been suggested for both
the short- and long-term to stabilize the Medicare+
Choice program. Some of the most frequently mentioned by members of Congress, HCFA officials, and
industry representatives include the following:




Delay the effective date of a number of BBA requirements, including QISMC and risk adjustment.
Extend the ACR filing deadline. Plans argue that
they need at least two full quarters of data to permit
consideration of the trend in health services utilization and cost. HCFA counters that it needs the
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information in advance so it can be included with
plan comparison information being provided to
beneficiaries during the fall open enrollment period.





Revise the payment formula. Health plans have
asked Congress to increase the 2 percent annual
minimum payment update to better reflect health
care inflation. In addition, they want to ensure that
the blend envisioned under the BBA formula is fully
funded without jeopardizing payment growth for
counties that would receive the 2 percent minimum
update or payment floor. Congressional members
from rural areas have suggested raising the floor to
attract more managed care plans to these areas.
Others suggest repealing or amending the elimination of GME from the payment formula. Any change
of this nature, however, would require additional
legislative mandates, with additional funding. Some
lawmakers, such as Rep. Pete Stark (D-Calif.), are
adamantly opposed to increasing payments to
HMOs, arguing that the ultimate objective of Medicare managed care is to save money.
Provide more protections for beneficiaries. Some
members of Congress have pushed for more protections for beneficiaries whose plans have terminated
their contracts such as requiring guaranteed issue for
more Medigap policies, extending protections to
disabled beneficiaries, extending enrollment periods,
or subsidizing Medigap coverage. Some policymakers
have called for adding prescription drug coverage to
the basic Medicare package or negotiating drug price
discounts for all Medicare beneficiaries.

THE FORUM SESSION
This Forum session will examine the reasons health
plans decided to withdraw from certain markets, the
impact of these decisions on Medicare beneficiaries,
and the implications for the future of the
Medicare+Choice program. The meeting will focus on
BBA provisions that may have contributed to HMO
pullouts and policy options under consideration.
The discussion will center on the following questions:





Are the pullouts indicative of trends that will ultimately undermine the Medicare+Choice program?
Or rather should we expect periodic market disruptions as the Medicare program relies more on private
health plans?
How have the Medicare+Choice program’s objectives—more choice for beneficiaries and slowed
growth in Medicare spending—played out in the

marketplace? If Medicare+Choice plans do not save
the Medicare program money, should policymakers
continue to promote their expansion?




What does this disruption in the marketplace mean
for Medicare beneficiaries? Will they be less likely
to join HMOs in the future?
Which BBA provisions should be revisited by
Congress? Have the implementation time frames
been too fast? Is one payment policy for urban/
suburban areas and rural areas feasible? What will
be the impact of risk adjustment on payment rates
and plan participation?

Speakers
Robert Berenson, M.D., director of the Center for
Health Plans and Providers, will summarize the latest
data available on the number, location, and types of
plans that have withdrawn or reduced their service
areas, as well as information on the status of beneficiary
coverage. In addition, he will outline HCFA’s strategy
for stabilizing the Medicare+Choice program for the
future (including legislative proposals to be included in
the president’s budget to be submitted to Congress on
February 1). Before joining HCFA, Dr. Berenson
served as vice president of the Lewin Group and for ten
years as a founder and medical director of the National
Capital Preferred Provider Organization. He also
practiced medicine for 12 years in a Washington, D.C.,
group practice.
Kathy Claunch, director of the Senior Health
Insurance Program (SHIP) of the Illinois Department of
Insurance, will review the reactions of Medicare beneficiaries to the pullouts and to the impact on their Medicare coverage. SHIP trains volunteers to assist Medicare
beneficiaries and their caregivers with their questions
and problems concerning Medicare, Medicare supplemental policies, long-term care policies, Medicare
HMOs and other health insurance issues. Ms. Claunch
also serves on the Illinois Medicare Beneficiary Advisory Committee, the Illinois Partners for Medicare
Consumers Committee, and the Medicare+Choice work
group sponsored by the Chicago Health Care Financing
Administration Regional Office.
Sheila Meehan, director of Health Benefits and Life
Services for the Bell Atlantic Corporation, will discuss
the impact of the withdrawals on her company’s retirees
and Bell Atlantic’s outlook on the future of Medicare
managed care for corporate retirees. Ms. Meehan is
responsible for the strategic planning and development
for all of Bell Atlantic’s health and welfare benefits.
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Additionally, she oversees the fitness and wellness
programs and occupational health services.
A panel of senior executives from three health plans
from different regions of the country will continue the
discussion. These speakers will discuss the market
conditions in which their plans operate, the reasons their
companies did or did not pull out of certain markets, and
suggested policy options to prevent further withdrawals.
Tom Anderson is vice president of Medicare Programs
for United HealthCare, a large national health plan. Mr.
Anderson oversees the company’s efforts in Medicare,
which has focused on rapid growth in existing health
plans as well as new geographic expansion.
Ellen Offner is vice president for Medicare Programs
at Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, a nonprofit health plan
located in Massachusetts. Prior to assuming her current
position, she was vice president, product development and
management, at Harvard Community Health Plan from
1992 to 1995 and held a variety of positions in planning
and finance there between 1982 and 1992.
Stephen J. deMontmollin is vice president and
general counsel of AvMed Health Plan, Florida’s oldest
and largest nonprofit HMO, where he is responsible for
corporate legal affairs, regulatory compliance, corporate
risk management, public policy, and is the corporate
compliance officer.
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